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  Few studies have examined the impact of international migration and remittances 
on poverty in a broad cross-section of developing countries.  This paper tries to fill this 
lacuna by constructing a new data set on poverty, international migration and remittances 
for 74 low and middle-income developing countries.  Four key findings emerge.  First, 
international migration – defined as the share of a country’s population living abroad – 
has a strong, statistical impact on reducing poverty.  On average, a 10 percent increase in 
the share of international migrants in a country’s population will lead to a 1.9 percent 
decline in the share of people living in poverty ($1.00/person/day).  Second, distance to a 
major labor-receiving region (like the United States or OECD (Europe) has an important 
effect on international migration.  Developing countries which are located closest to the 
United States or OECD (Europe) are also those countries with the highest rates of 
migration.  Third, an inverted U-shaped curve exists between the level of country per 
capita income and international migration.  Developing countries with low or high per 
capita GDP produce smaller shares of international migrants than do middle-income 
developing countries.  This study finds no evidence that developing countries with higher 
levels of poverty produce more migrants.  Because of the considerable travel costs 
associated with international migration, international migrants come from those income 
groups which are just above the poverty line in middle-income developing countries.  
Finally, international remittances --  defined as the share of remittances in country GDP – 
has a strong, statistical impact on reducing poverty.  On average, a 10 percent increase in 
the share of international remittances in a country’s GDP will lead to a 1.6 percent 




International migration is one of the most important factors affecting economic 
relations between developed and developing countries in the 21
st Century.  At the start of 
the century the United Nations estimated that about 175 million people – roughly 3 
percent of the world population – lived and worked outside the country of their birth.  
The remittances – money and goods – sent back home by these migrant workers have a 
profound impact on the living standards of people in the developing countries of Asia, 
Africa, Latin America and the Middle East.  In 2002 the flow of international remittances 
to developing countries stood at $80 billion per year, a figure which was much higher 
than total official aid flows to the developing world.
1   
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of international migration and 
remittances on poverty in a broad cross-section of developing countries.  In the past, a 
number of studies have examined the effect of international migration and remittances on 
poverty in specific village or country settings,
2 but we are not aware of any studies which 
examine the impact of these phenomena on poverty in a broad range of developing 
countries.  Two factors seem to be responsible.  The first is a lack of poverty data;  it is 
quite difficult to estimate accurate and meaningful poverty headcounts in a wide and 
diverse range of developing countries.  The second factor relates to the nature of data on 
international migration and remittances.  Not only do few developing countries publish 
records on migration flows, but many developed countries which do keep records on 
migration tend to undercount the large number of illegal migrants living within their   3
borders.  At the same time, the available data on international remittances do not include 
the large (and unknown) sum of remittance monies which are transmitted through private, 
unofficial channels.   As a result of these data problems, a host of key policy questions 
remain unanswered.  Exactly what is the impact of international migration and 
remittances on poverty in the developing world?  How do international migration and 
remittances affect poverty in different regions of the developing world?  What are the 
factors which cause people to migrate in the developing world? 
This paper proposes to answer these, and similar, questions by using a new data 
set composed of 74 developing countries.  This data set includes all those low- and 
middle-income developing countries for which reasonable information on poverty, 
inequality, international migration and remittances could be assembled.  The data set 
includes countries drawn from each major region of the developing world:  Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, Europe and Central Asia, East 
Asia, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.   
The balance of this paper is organized as follows.  Part 1 sets the stage by 
reviewing the findings of recent village- or country-level studies on the relationship 
between international migration, remittances and poverty.  Part 2 then presents the new 
data set.  Part 3 describes how this data set uses new sources of information to calculate 
the relevant migration, remittances and poverty variables.  Part 4 describes the main 
econometric findings on the relationship between migration, remittances and poverty, and 
Part 5 discusses the determinants of international migration.  The final section, Part 6, 
concludes. 
   4
1.  International Migration, Remittances and Poverty 
  In the literature there is little agreement and scant information concerning the 
impact of international migration on poverty.  Charles Stahl, for example, writes that 
“migration, particularly international migration, can be an expensive venture.  Clearly it 
is going to be the better-off households which will be more capable of (producing 
international migrants).”
3  Similarly, Michael Lipton, in a study of 40 villages in India 
that focuses more on internal than international migration, found that “migration 
increases intra-rural inequalities. . . because better-off migrants are ‘pulled’ towards fairly 
firm prospects of a job (in a city or abroad), whereas the poor are ‘pushed’ by rural 
poverty and labor-replacing methods.”
4   
  Other analysts, however, suggest that the poor can and do benefit from  
international migration.  For example, Oded Stark finds that in rural Mexico “relatively 
deprived” households are more likely to engage in international migration than are “better 
off” households.
5  In a similar vein Richard Adams, Jr. finds that in rural Egypt the 
number of poor households declines by 9.8 percent when household income includes 
international remittances, and that remittances account for 14.7 percent of total income of 
poor households.
6 
  While the findings of these past studies are instructive, their conclusions are of 
limited usefulness due to small sample size.  Stark’s findings, for instance are based on 
61 households from two Mexican villages while those of Adams’ are based on 1000 
households from three Egyptian villages.  Clearly, there is a need to extend the scope of 
these studies to see if their findings hold for a larger and broader collection of developing 
countries.   5
 
2.  A New Data Set on International Migration, Remittances and Poverty   
Our evaluation of the impact of international migration and remittances in 
developing countries is based on a new data set that includes information on international 
migration, remittances, income inequality and poverty for 74 “low income” and “middle 
income” developing countries.
7  These countries were selected because it was possible to 
find relevant migration, remittances and poverty data for all of these countries since the 
year 1980.
8  Since it was not easy to assemble this data set, and data problems still plague 
this (and all other) studies on migration and remittances, it is useful to spell out how this 
information was assembled.   
In the case of migration, few, if any, of the major labor-exporting countries 
publish accurate records on the number of international migrants that they produce.  It is 
therefore necessary to estimate migration stocks and flows by using data collected by the 
main labor-receiving countries.  For the purposes of this paper, the main labor-receiving 
countries (regions) include two:  United States and the OECD (Europe), excluding North 
America and Asia.
9  Unfortunately, no data are available on the amount of migration to 
the third and fourth most important labor-receiving regions in the world, the Arab Gulf 
and South Africa. 
Because of their importance to labor-exporting countries, remittance flows tend to 
be the best measured aspect of the migration experience.  For instance, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) keeps annual records of the amount of worker remittances received 
by each labor-exporting country.
10  However, as noted above, the IMF only reports data 
on official worker remittance flows, that is, remittance monies which are transmitted   6
through official banking channels.  Since a large (and unknown) proportion of remittance 
monies is transmitted through private, unofficial channels, the level of remittances 
recorded by the IMF underestimates the actual flow of remittance monies returning to 
labor-exporting countries.
11  The remittance figures used in this paper therefore 
underestimate the actual level of  international remittances – official and unofficial – 
received by individual countries.   
Finally, with respect to poverty, many developing countries – especially the 
smaller population countries -- have not conducted the type of nationally-representative 
household budget surveys that are needed to estimate poverty.  For example, of the 157 
developing countries classified as low- or middle-income by the World Bank,
12 only 81 
countries (52 percent) have published the results of any household budget survey.  Of 
these 81 developing countries, missing data on income inequality reduced the size of the 
data set used in this paper to 74 countries. 
Annex Table A1 gives the countries, regions, poverty, inequality, migration and 
remittances indicators included in the new data set.  The data set includes a total of 190 
observations from the 74 developing countries; an observation is any point in time for 
which data on all the relevant variables exist.  The data set is notable in that it includes 42 
observations (from 21 countries) in  Sub-Saharan Africa, a region for which migration 
and poverty data are relatively rare.  It also includes observations from countries in all 
other regions of the developing world.   7
3.  Calculation of Poverty, Inequality, Migration and Remittance Variables 
Annex Table A1 reports three different poverty measures.  The first, the 
headcount index, set at $1 per person per day, measures the percent of the population 
living beneath that poverty line at the time of the survey.
13  However, the headcount 
index ignores the “depth of poverty,” that is, the amount by which the average 
expenditure (income) of the poor fall short of the poverty line.
14  We therefore also report 
the poverty gap index, which measures in percentage terms how far the average 
expenditure (income) of the poor fall short of the poverty line.  For instance, a poverty 
gap of 10 percent means that the average poor person’s expenditure (income) is 90 
percent of the poverty line.  The third poverty measure --  the squared poverty gap index 
– indicates the severity of poverty.  The squared poverty gap index possesses useful 
analytical properties, because it is sensitive to changes in distribution among the poor.
15   
  To measure inequality, Annex Table A1 uses the Gini coefficient.  In the table 
this measure is normalized by household size and the distributions are weighted by 
household size so that a given quintile (such as the lowest quintile) has the same share of 
population as other quintiles across the sample.   
The remaining variables in Annex Table A1 – migration as share of country 
population and remittances as share of country GDP – are of key importance to this 
study.  Since these two variables must be estimated using some rather heroic 
assumptions, it is crucial to discuss each variable in turn.   
In the absence of detailed records on international migration in the labor- 
exporting countries, the migration variable in this study is estimated by combining data 
from the two main labor-receiving regions of the world:  the United States and OECD   8
(Europe).  Specifically, the migration variable is constructed using three steps.  The first 
step uses data from the 1990 and 2000 U.S. Population Censuses on the “place of birth 
for the foreign-born population.”   While these data are disaggregated by country of birth 
for about 50 different labor-exporting countries, it is not at all clear whether all of these 
“foreign-born” people are, in fact international migrants.  For example, a person born in 
Mexico and brought to the United States as an infant would probably not consider 
himself as a migrant.  Moreover, it is also not clear how many of those who enter the 
United States illegally are, in fact, included in the “foreign-born” population figures.  As 
some observers have suggested, the U.S. Census data may be grossly undercounting the 
actual migrant population that is living – legally or illegally – in the United States.
16    
The second step in calculating the migration variable is to estimate the number of 
“foreign born” living in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) (Europe), excluding North America and Asia.
17  Unfortunately, the OECD 
(Europe) data are not as detailed as the U.S. Census data, and differ from the United 
States data in several key ways.  Most basically, the OECD (Europe) data use a different 
way of classifying immigrants.  Since United States-born children of immigrants have US 
citizenship, the United States defines an immigrant as a person who was born abroad to 
non-US citizens.  Most OECD (Europe) countries, however, follow an ethnicity-based 
definition of immigration status.  This method classifies a person on the basis of the 
ethnicity of the parent, rather than on place of birth.  Thus, a child of Turkish parents 
born in Germany is typically classified as an immigrant.  This different way of 
classifying immigrants has the net effect of increasing the stock of immigrants in any 
particular OECD (Europe) country, and perhaps biasing our estimates by including a   9
number of  “migrants” who were actually born, raised and educated in that OECD 
(Europe) country.  Another key difference between the OECD (Europe) data and the 
United States data has to do with the number of labor-exporting countries recorded.  
While the U.S. Census data can be used to count the number of “foreign-born” (or 
migrants) from about 50 different countries, the OECD (Europe) data only record the 
number of “foreign-born” (or migrants) in each European country coming from ten or 
fifteen countries.  While this is not a significant problem for large-labor exporting 
countries (like Turkey), which send many migrants to Europe, it is a problem for smaller 
labor-exporting countries, like Brazil or Sri Lanka, where the actual number of migrants 
to any particular European country might not be recorded at all. 
The final step in calculating the migration variable is to take the sum of the 
“foreign born” from each labor-exporting country that are living in either the United 
States or the OECD (Europe), and divide this sum by the population of each developing 
country.  These “migration as share of population” figures are the ones which appear in 
Annex Table A1.  In all likelihood, these figures seriously under-estimate the actual 
number of  international migrants produced by any given labor-exporting country, 
because they do not include the large number of illegal migrants working in the United 
States and OECD (Europe).   These figures also do not count the unknown number of 
international migrants working in other labor-receiving regions (like the Arab Gulf). 
  The process of calculating the remittances variable in Annex Table A1 is more 
straight-forward, but it also involves one heroic assumption.  All remittance data comes 
from the IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook.  As noted above, the main 
problem with these data is that they count only remittance monies which enter through   10
official, banking channels; they do not include the large (and unknown) amount of 
remittance monies which are sent home through private, unofficial channels.  For 
example, in one major labor-exporting country – Egypt – it has been estimated that 
unofficial remittances amount to between one-third and one-half of total official 
remittances.
18  For this reason, it is likely that the “official remittance” figures recorded in 
Annex Table A1 are gross under-estimates of the actual level of remittances (official and 
unofficial) entering each labor-exporting county.   
 
4.  Migration, Remittances and Poverty Reduction:  Econometric Model and Results 
In this section we use the cross-country data to analyze how international  
migration and remittances affect poverty in the developing world.  Using the basic 
growth-poverty model suggested by Martin Ravallion and Shaohua Chen,
19  the 
relationship that we want to estimate can be written as 
Log Pit =  αi  + β1 log µit + β2 log (git) +  β3 log (xit) + εit       (1)                                      
                   (i = 1, . ., N; t = 1, . ., Ti)                                                                                   
 
           Where P is the measure of poverty in country i at time t, β1 is the “elasticity of 
poverty” with respect to mean per capita income given by µ,  β2 is the elasticity of poverty 
with respect to income distribution given by g, β3 is the elasticity of poverty with respect 
to variable x (such as international migration or remittances) and ε is an error term that 
includes errors in the poverty measure. 
The income variable in equation (1) can be measured in two different ways:  (1) 
per capita GDP, in purchasing power parity (PPP) units, as measured from national 
accounts data; and (2) per capita survey mean income (expenditure), as calculated from  
household budget surveys done in the various developing countries.  As Angus Deaton    11
and others have shown,
20 these two measures of income typically do not agree.  Income 
(expenditure) as measured by household surveys is calculated from the responses of 
individual households.  However, income as measured by GDP data comes from the 
national accounts, which measure household income as a residual item, so that errors and 
omission elsewhere in the accounts automatically affect the calculation of household 
income (expenditure).  Since the national accounts data also include many items (such as 
the expenditures of nonprofit organizations and the imputed rent of owner-occupied 
dwellings) which are not included in the household surveys, it is little wonder that the 
two measures of income do not correspond.  
For the purposes of this study, we will use estimate equation (1) using both 
measures of income.  This will allow us to test the robustness of our findings to different 
definitions of income. 
In the literature equation (1) is often measured in first differences, in order to deal 
with possible correlation problems between the variables, since the dependent and 
independent variables are drawn from the same single source of data (household budget 
surveys).  In this study, however, we will estimate equation (1) as a level equation since 
the dependent and independent variables come from different sources of data:  the 
dependent variable being drawn from household budget surveys and the independent 
variables (for migration and remittances) from various other sources.
21  
  Using the migration data, OLS estimates of equation (1) are presented in Table 1.   
Since all of the variables are estimated in log terms, the results can be interpreted as 
elasticities of poverty with respect to the relevant variable.   12
In Table 1 the coefficients for both of the income variables – GDP and survey 
mean income-- are of the expected (negative) sign and statistically significant in all cases.  
However, the results for the model as a whole are better and more precise when estimated 
using survey mean income:  the R
2 coefficients increase from the 0.4-0.5 range to 0.6-0.7.  
For this reason, we will focus on the results using survey mean income. 
In Table 1 the poverty elasticities with respect to income inequality (Gini 
coefficient) are positive, as expected, and their magnitude is consistent with other recent 
analyses of poverty reduction.
22  The latter outcome suggests that countries with higher 
income inequality also have higher poverty.  
  When the dependent variable in Table 1 is poverty headcount or poverty gap, the 
results for the migration variable are negative and statistically significant.  However, 
when the dependent variable is squared poverty gap, the share of migrants in the 
country’s population has no significant impact on poverty.  For the poverty headcount 
measure, the estimates using survey mean income suggest that, on average, a 10 percent 
increase in the share of migrants in the country’s population will lead to a 1.9 percent 
decline in the share of people living on less than $1.00 per person per day.   This means 
that for a “representative” country if exactly one-half of the population lives below the 
poverty line of $1.00/person/day, a 10 percent increase in migration will bring the 
proportion living in poverty down to about 0.49, holding the level and distribution of 
income constant. International migration has a small, but statistically significant impact 
on poverty reduction, independent of the level of income and its distribution.  
Table 2 shows the results when equation (1) is estimated using remittances data.  
The remittances variable – remittances as share of country GDP – has a negative and   13
significant impact on all three measures of poverty:  headcount, poverty gap and squared 
poverty gap.  As was the case with the migration model, the size of the elasticity of 
poverty with respect to remittances is small.  On average, the point estimates for the 
poverty headcount measure using survey mean income suggest that a 10 percent increase 
in the share of remittances in country GDP will lead to a 1.6 percent decline in the share 
of people living on less than $1.00 per person per day.  Controlling for the level of 
income and income inequality, the more sensitive poverty measures – the poverty gap 
and squared poverty gap – suggest that international remittances will have a slightly 
larger impact on poverty reduction.  The point estimates for the poverty gap and squared 
poverty gap suggest that, on average, a 10 percent increase in the share of remittances 
will lead to about a 2.0 percent decline in the depth and/or severity of poverty. 
It is useful to speculate on the reasons why international migration and 
remittances have such a small – albeit statistically significant – impact on poverty 
reduction.  As noted at the outset, both of these variables are probably underestimated 
with respect to their true values.    The variable “migrants as a share of country 
population” is underestimated because it does not include the large number of people 
who illegally migrate to the United States or the OECD (Europe); also, this variable does 
not include the large number of migrants who go to work in other labor-receiving regions 
(like the Arab Gulf or South Africa).  Similarly, the variable “remittances as share of 
country GDP” does not include the large (and unknown) amount of money that is 
remitted through private, unofficial channels.  Since workers who migrate illegally are 
more likely to be poor and to remit through unofficial channels, it is likely that the 
variables used in this study underestimate the true impact of international migration and   14
remittances on poverty in labor-exporting countries.  If, in the future, it would be possible 
to get more accurate estimates of the number of legal and illegal migrants, and their 
official and unofficial remittances, it is likely that international migration and remittances 
would have an even stronger statistical impact on poverty reduction in the developing 
world. 
Data problems notwithstanding,  the results provide an intriguing puzzle and point 
to an important area for future work. Remittance flows can be treated analytically in the 
same way as any other increase in national income. Their poverty reducing impact 
derives from two sources:  first, from an increase in per capita GDP or survey mean 
income (given the distribution of income); and second, from any contemporaneous 
change in the distribution of income that occurs as a result of the receipt of remittances 
by different income groups. If the distributional bias of remittance income to households 
is progressive, the poverty reducing impact of the increase in income will be greater than 
if the distribution had remained unchanged. A regressive bias will result in the opposite 
outcome.  
  In our econometric specifications we control for the level of per capita income 
and for its distribution. Yet we still find a significant independent poverty reducing 
impact of both migration and (more convincingly) remittances on the poverty headcount 
as well as some measures of depth and severity. Put another way, perhaps rather than 
express surprise at the small magnitudes of the elasticity of poverty reduction with 
respect to the migration and remittance variables, we should be surprised that they are 
significant at all. Is there a "third channel" by which incomes remitted affect the level and 
severity of poverty in developing countries?   15
  Our data do not permit us to move beyond speculation. But, one conjecture, at 
least, is consistent with the data.  Because the distributional data change with less 
frequency than the poverty and income data, the migration and remittance variables may 
be picking up the effect of a progressive bias in the distribution of remittance income 
among households.  In this case, while the main channel by which remittances reduce 
poverty is via the income variable, their distributional impact is captured by the  
independent migration/remittances variable. The fact that in the case of the poverty gap 
and the squared poverty gap the elasticity of the measure with respect to remittances is 
greater than for the headcount may lead some credence to this hypothesis. 
 
4.  Determinants of International Migration and Remittances 
Since international migration and remittances reduce poverty in our full sample of 
developing countries, it is useful to explore the determinants of migration.  In the 
literature the determinants of international migration are often analyzed using the type of 
gravity model suggested by M. Greenwood and George Borjas.
23  In general terms, such 
a model can be expressed as: 
Mij = α0 + α1 pi + α2 yi + α3 cij + εij   (i = 1, . ., N; j = 1, . ., N)   (2) 
 
Where Mij is the migration flow between labor-exporting country i and labor-receiving 
region j,
24 pi is the population of labor-exporting country i, yi is the per capita income of 
labor-exporting country i,  cij is the costs of migrating from country i to j, and ε is an error 
term.  
  Unfortunately, equation (2) cannot be estimated because our data set contains no 
information on the costs of migration (cij).  Since this problem is also common to other   16
empirical studies, a typical solution is to use the shortest air distance between labor-
exporting and labor–receiving countries as a proxy variable.
25  This is the solution that 
will be adopted here:  the costs of migrating will be measured by the air distance from the 
labor-exporting country to one of three labor-receiving regions (United States, OECD 
(Europe) or the Arab Gulf). 
In addition to the three explanatory variables listed in equation (2) – population, 
income and migration costs – recent empirical work has suggested that other economic, 
demographic and political variables may also influence the decision to migrate.
26  From 
an economic standpoint, it is useful to enter both an income variable and its square in the 
equation to see if the propensity to migrate rises and then declines with level of country 
income (development).  Some studies have also hypothesized that other economic 
variables – such as higher rates of income inequality, inflation and unemployment – tend 
to encourage migration from labor-exporting countries.
27  With respect to demographic 
factors, human capital theory argues that more educated people are more likely to migrate 
because they enjoy higher wage-earning opportunities in labor-receiving countries.
28  
Finally, policy variables – such as the level of government stability and  a country’s 
credit worthiness – may have an effect on migration.
29   The reasoning here is that people 
will be more likely to migrate from countries that are politically unstable or that have 
poor economic management as manifested by low international credit ratings. 
Combining all of these variables together, the empirical version of the migration 
model to be estimated can be written as: 
            Log Mij = λ0 + λ1 log(dij) + λ2 log(gi) + λ3 log(yi) + λ4 log(yi)
2 + λ5 log(rfi) 
               + λ6 log (rui)  + λ 7 log(pi) + λ8 log(edi) + λ9 log(govi) + λ10 log(cri)    17
               + εij (i = 1, . ., N; j = 1, . ., N)                        (3) 
Where dij is the distance between labor-exporting country i and labor-receiving region j, 
and for each labor-exporting country i, g is the level of income inequality (measured by 
the Gini coefficient), y is income (measured by per capita GDP), rf is the rate of 
consumer inflation, ru is the rate of unemployment, p is the population density (people 
per square kilometer), ed is the share of the population over 25 years with a secondary 
education, gov is a measure of government stability,
30 and  cr is the country’s credit 
rating.
31 
In estimating equation (3) all of the variables are expressed in log terms.  This 
means that the results can be interpreted as elasticities.  Table 3 lists all of the variables 
and their descriptive statistics. 
Equation (3) is estimated in a stepwise manner for each group of variables.  Since 
the propensity to migrate might vary by geographical region, dummy variables (not 
shown) are added to the model for the various regions.   The results are reported in Table 
4.   
The first, and most important, result concerns the distance variable.  In all 
versions of the model the coefficient for distance is negatively and significantly related to 
migration.  On average, a 10 percent increase in distance to a labor-receiving region will 
reduce the share of international migration from a country by between 9.5 and 15.3 
percent.   
This result, which is based on flows of legal migration between countries, 
parallels those of other studies.
32  It  also accords with reality because a quick glance at 
Annex Table A1 shows that those countries which are closest to the United States – like   18
Mexico and Jamaica -- and the OECD (Europe) – like Morocco and Turkey -- are also 
those countries which have the highest rates of international migration.  All other things 
being constant, citizens of countries which are located close to major labor-receiving 
regions have a higher propensity to migrate because their costs of migration are lower. 
Only two of the economic variables in Table 4 are significantly related with 
international migration: income inequality (Gini coefficient) and per capita GDP (and its 
square).  The Gini coefficient is positively related to migration, which means that 
countries with higher levels of income inequality produce a larger share of international 
migrants.  On average, a 10 percent increase in the Gini coefficient will raise the share of 
migration between 15.2 and 24.5 percent.  At first glance, these elasticities appear to be 
quite large, but it is important to remember that a 10 percent change in the Gini 
coefficient is unusual.  On the whole, Gini coefficients tend to be fairly stable over 
time.
33 
The statistically significant results for the per capita GDP variable (and its square) 
are instructive and suggest that an inverted U-shaped curve exists between the level of 
country income (development) and international migration.
34  In other words, developing 
countries with low or high per capita GDP incomes produce smaller shares of 
international migrants than do middle-income developing countries.  In the data set the 
share of international migration in a country’s population increases until a country has a 
per capita GDP income (in 1995 prices) of $1630,
35 and falls thereafter.  This result, 
which has been observed elsewhere,
36 suggests that people from middle-income 
developing countries have a higher propensity to migrate because they are able to afford 
the travel costs associated with international migration, while people from higher-income   19
developing countries lack the incentive to go work abroad.  At the same time, people 
from low-income countries – like those in Sub-Saharan Africa – lack the financial means 
to become international migrants.
 37      
Since the focus of this study is on international migration and poverty, it is 
instructive to replace the per capita GDP variable (and its square) in Table 4 with a 
poverty variable (headcount index of poverty) (and its square) and to re-estimate the 
equations.
 38  This is done in equations 4(3), 4(5) and 4(7).  The results show that the 
poverty variable is never statistically significant.  In other words, while international 
migration statistically reduces the level of poverty in developing countries (Table 1), the 
headcount index of poverty has no systematic relationship with the share of international 
migrants produced by countries.  One possible explanation for this apparent inconsistency 
is as follows.   Because of the considerable travel costs associated with international 
migration, it is possible that international migrants come mainly from those income 
groups which are located above the poverty line,
39 and that their remittances – sent to 
poor family members at home—have the effect of reducing poverty in labor-exporting 
countries.      
  Both of the demographic variables in Table 4 – population density and share of 
population with high school education  – are positively and significantly related to 
migration.   The first outcome is sensible because it means that more populated countries 
also produce larger shares of migrants.  The latter outcome is in accord with human 
capital theory, which suggests that more educated people – in this case, people with a  
secondary education -- are more likely to migrate because they enjoy higher wage-
earning opportunities working abroad.
40    20
   The final variable which is statistically significant in Table 4 is country credit 
rating, which is negatively related to international migration.  This result means that 
countries with a higher (i.e. better) credit rating produce a lower share of international 
migrants.  One way to interpret this finding is that countries with better macro-economic 
management are able to achieve a higher credit rating in the international marketplace.  
This in turn enables them to attract more foreign and domestic capital to create more jobs 
at home and reduce the need (incentive) for people to migrate abroad.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper has used a new data set of 74 low- and middle-income developing 
countries to examine the impact of international migration and remittances on poverty.  
Five key findings emerge. 
 First,  international  migration – defined as the share of a country’s population that 
is living abroad – has a strong, statistical impact on reducing poverty in the developing 
world.  On average, a 10 percent increase in the share of international migrants in a 
country’s population will lead to a 1.9 percent decline in the share of people living on 
less than $1.00 per person per day.   
  Second, as might be expected, distance to a major labor-receiving region (the 
United States, OECD (Europe) or Arab Gulf) has an important effect on the level of 
international migration.  On average, the results suggest that a 10 percent increase in a 
country’s distance to a major labor-receiving region will reduce the share of migration 
from that country by between 9.5 and 15.3 percent.  This result is sensible because those 
countries which are located closest to the United States – like Mexico and Jamaica – and   21
the OECD (Europe) – like Morocco and Turkey – are also those countries with the 
highest rates of international migration.  
  Third, an inverted U-shaped curve exists between the level of country per capita  
income and international migration.  Developing countries with low or high per capita 
GDP produce smaller shares of international migrants than middle-income developing 
countries.  People from low-income developing countries – like Sub-Saharan Africa – 
lack the financial means to become international migrants, while people from higher-
income developing countries lack the incentive to go work abroad.  At the same time, 
countries with higher levels of poverty ($1.00/person/day) do not produce more migrants.  
This study finds no statistical relationship between the level of poverty headcount in a 
country and the share of international migration.  When coupled together, these findings 
suggest that international migrants do not come from the poorest strata of either countries 
or society:  because of the considerable travel costs associated with international 
migration, international migrants appear to come from those  income groups in middle-
income developing countries which are located above the poverty line.  These “almost 
poor” people are pushed into international migration through a desire to improve what 
Oded Stark calls their “status of relative deprivation” vis-à-vis the rich.
41  More work is 
needed to clarify how these forces affect the propensity of people to migrate.    
  Fourth, this study finds that international remittances – defined as the share of 
remittances in country GDP  – has a negative and statistically significant effect on all 
three poverty measures used in the analysis.  On average, the point estimates for the 
poverty headcount measure suggest that a 10 percent increase in the share of remittances 
in country GDP will lead to a 1.6 percent decline in the share of people living on less   22
than $1.00 per person per day.  However, the more sensitive poverty measures – the 
poverty gap and squared poverty gap – suggest that international remittances will have a 
slightly larger impact on poverty reduction.  The point estimates for the poverty gap and 
squared poverty gap suggest that a 10 percent increase in the share of remittances will 
lead to about a 2.0 percent decline in the depth and/or severity of poverty in the 
developing world.  While international migrants do not come from the ranks of the poor, 
the income that migrants remit to their origin communities appears to both increase 
average income and to reduce both the incidence and severity of poverty. 
  The final finding is more of a plea than a conclusion.  From the standpoint of 
future work on this topic, more attention needs to be paid to collecting and publishing 
better data on international migration and remittances.  With respect to migration, it 
would be useful if developing countries would start publishing records on the number and 
destination of their international migrants.  In many developing countries, these data are 
already being collected, but they are not being published.  With respect to international 
remittances, the International Monetary Fund should make greater efforts to count the 
amount of remittance monies that are transmitted through private, unofficial channels.  
Poor people, especially poor people from countries located near the major labor-receiving 
regions of the world, are more likely to remit through informal, unofficial channels.  For 
this reason, a full and complete accounting of the impact of the remittances on poverty in 
the developing world needs more accurate data on the large and currently unknown level 
of unofficial remittance transfers.      23
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Table 1.  Elasticity of Poverty, Estimated Using International Migration Data 
 
 Dependent  Variable  = 
Poverty Headcount 
Dependent Variable = 
Poverty Gap 
Dependent Variable =  
Squared Poverty Gap 
 ($1.08/person/day)     
Variable (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
            














            








            












            















            












            
N 109  106  109  106  106  100 
            
Adj R
2 0.494  0.767  0.481  0.722  0.399  0.598 
            
F-Statistic 36.11  116.09  34.41  92.0  22.91  50.12 
 
Notes:  Estimates obtained using ordinary least squares.  All variables expressed in logs.  T-ratios shown in parenthesis.  Number of observations 
reduced for certain equations because of missing values.  See Annex Table A1 for countries and survey dates. 
 
 
1 Migrants measured as number of immigrants from country recorded as living in the United States or OECD (Europe). 
 
  * Significant at the 0.10 level. 
  ** Significant at the 0.05 level.   28
 
Table 2.  Elasticity of Poverty, Estimated Using International Remittance Data 
 
 Dependent  Variable  = 
Poverty Headcount 
Dependent Variable = 
Poverty Gap 
Dependent Variable =  
Squared Poverty Gap 
 ($1.08/person/day)     
Variable (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
            











            








            












            














            












            
N 104  99  104  99  93  92 
            
Adj R
2 0.443  0.746  0.499  0.733  0.517  0.722 
            
F-Statistic 28.29  97.23  35.19  90.77  33.84  79.94 
 
 
Notes:  Estimates obtained using ordinary least squares.  All variables expressed in logs.  T-ratios shown in parenthesis.  Number of observations 
reduced in table because of missing values.  See Annex Table A1 for countries and survey dates. 
  * Significant at the 0.10 level. 
  ** Significant at the 0.05 level.   29
 






Distance (miles) from country to labor-receiving region 





Gini coefficient  -0.92 
(0.28) 
Per capita GDP (constant 1995 dollars)  6.98 
(0.97) 
Poverty headcount ($1/person/day)  2.37 
(1.54) 
Rate of consumer inflation  2.91 
(1.34) 
Rate of unemployment in labor force  2.08 
(0.79) 
Demographic variables   
Population density (people per sq km)  3.88 
(1.20) 




Political, Financial variables   
Government stability  1.74 
(0.34) 
Country credit rating  3.22 
(0.48) 
 
Notes:   All variables expressed in logs. 
 
Sources:  All poverty and inequality data from Annex Table A1.  Data on per capita GDP, consumer 
inflation, unemployment, population density, and secondary education from World Bank, SIMA 
database.  Government stability data from PRS Group, International Country Risk Guide.  
Country credit ratings from International Investor. 
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Table 4.  Estimating the Determinants of International Migration 
  Dependent Variable = Migrants as Share of Country Population 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Distance (miles) from country to labor-
















       

































































       








Share of population over age 25 with 
secondary education 








Political, Financial variables         






















N  121 94 88 91 85 88 82 
Adj R
2  0.470 0.580 0.489 0.671 0.625 0.685 0.649 
F-Statistic  18.75 12.68  8.56  15.15 11.79 13.66 10.99 
 
Notes:  Estimates obtained using ordinary least squares.  All variables based on labor-exporting country and expressed in logs.  T-ratios shown in  parenthesis; coefficients 
for regional dummies not reposted.  Number of observations reduced for certain equations because of missing values.  See Annex Table A1 for countries and survey 
dates. 
 
* Significant at the 0.10 level.            ** Significant at the 0.05 level.   31

























Share of GDP 
(constant 1995 
dollars) 
Algeria  1988  Middle East, North 
Africa 
1.75 0.64 0.48  0.414  2.77  379 0.97 
Algeria  1995  Middle East, North 
Africa 
1.16 0.23 0.094  0.353  2.01  1101 2.63 
Bangladesh 1984  South  Asia  26.16  5.98  1.96  0.258  0.04 527 2.19 
Bangladesh  1986 South  Asia  21.96 3.92 1.07  0.269  0.04  497 1.9 
Bangladesh  1989 South  Asia  33.75 7.72 2.44  0.288  0.05  771 2.68 
Bangladesh  1992 South  Asia  35.86 8.77 2.98  0.282  0.06  848 2.55 
Bangladesh  1996 South  Asia  29.07 5.88 1.6  0.336  0.09  1217 3.16 
Belarus  1988  Europe, Central Asia  0  0  0  0.227  0  0 0 
Belarus  1993  Europe, Central Asia  1.06  0.13  0.03  0.216  0  0 0 
Belarus  1995  Europe, Central Asia  2.27  0.71  0.46  0.287  0  29 0.27 
Bolivia 1990  Latin  America  11.28  2.22  0.6  0.42  0.47  2 0.03 
Botswana 1985  Sub-Saharan  Africa  33.3  12.53  6.09  0.542  0  0 0 
Brazil 1985  Latin  America  15.8  4.69  1.82  0.595  0.05  25 0.01 
Brazil  1988 Latin  America  18.62 6.78 3.22  0.624  0.05  19 0.01 
Brazil  1993 Latin  America  18.79 8.38 5.01  0.615  0.08  1123 0.17 
Brazil  1995 Latin  America  13.94 3.94 1.46  0.6  0.09  2891 0.41 
Brazil  1997 Latin  America  5.1 1.32  0.5  0.517 0.11  1324 0.17 
Bulgaria  1989  Europe, Central Asia  0  0  0  0.233 0.2  0 0 
Bulgaria  1992  Europe, Central Asia  0  0  0  0.308 0.2  0 0 
Bulgaria  1995  Europe, Central Asia  0  0  0  0.285 0.2  0 0 
Burkina Faso  1994  Sub-Saharan Africa  61.18  25.51  13.03  0.482  0  80 3.83 
Central African Rep  1993  Sub-Saharan Africa  66.58 40.04 28.56  0.613  0  0 0 
Chile 1987  Latin  America  10.2  2.25  0.66  0.564  0.4  0 0 
Chile  1990 Latin  America  8.26 2.03 0.73  0.56  0.42  0 0 
Chile  1992 Latin  America  3.91 0.74 0.23  0.557  0.44  0 0 
Chile  1994 Latin  America  4.18 0.65 0.15  0.548  0.46  0 0 
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Share of GDP 
(constant 1995 
dollars) 
Colombia  1988  Latin  America  4.47 1.31 0.57  0.531  0.8  448 0.65 
Colombia  1991 Latin  America  2.82 0.75 0.32  0.513  0.86  866 1.14 
Colombia  1995 Latin  America  8.87 2.05 0.63  0.574  1.02  739 0.8 
Colombia  1996 Latin  America  10.99 3.16 1.21  0.571  1.06  635 0.67 
Costa Rica  1986  Latin America  12.52 5.44 3.27  0.344  1.43  0 0 
Costa Rica  1990 Latin  America  11.08 4.19 2.37  0.456  1.41  0 0 
Costa Rica  1993 Latin  America  10.3 3.53  1.79  0.462 1.58  0 0 
Costa Rica  1996 Latin  America  9.57 3.18 1.55  0.47  1.71  122 1.03 
Côte d’Ivoire  1985  Sub-Saharan Africa  4.71 0.59 0.1  0.412  0  0 0 
Côte d’Ivoire  1987  Sub-Saharan  Africa  3.28 0.41 0.08  0.4  0  0 0 
Côte d’Ivoire  1993  Sub-Saharan  Africa  9.88 1.86 0.54  0.369  0  0 0 
Côte d’Ivoire  1995 Sub-Saharan  Africa  12.29  2.4  0.71  0.367  0  0 0 
Czech Republic  1988  Europe, Central  Asia  0 0 0  0.194  1.73  0 0 
Czech Republic  1993  Europe, Central  Asia  0 0 0  0.266  1.53  0 0 
Dominican Republic  1989  Latin America  7.73  1.51  0.42  0.504  4.89  301 2.91 
Dominican Republic  1996  Latin America  3.19  0.71  0.26  0.487  7.08  914 7.13 
Ecuador 1988  Latin  America  24.85  10.21  5.82  0.439  1.38  0 0 
Ecuador 1995  Latin  America  20.21  5.77  2.27  0.437  1.92  382 2.13 
Egypt  1991  Middle East, North 
Africa 
3.97 0.53 0.13  0.35  0.15  2569 4.99 
Egypt  1995  Middle East, North 
Africa 
5.55 0.66 0.13  0.283  0.18  3279 5.45 
El Salvador  1989  Latin America  25.49  13.72  10.06  0.489  9.06  228 3.39 
El Salvador  1996  Latin America  25.26  10.35  5.79  0.522  11.67  1084 11.22 
Estonia  1988  Europe, Central Asia  0  0  0  0.229  0  0 0 
Estonia  1993  Europe, Central Asia  3.15  0.91  0.51  0.395  0  0 0 
Estonia  1995  Europe, Central Asia  4.85  1.18  0.39  0.353  0  0 0 
Ethiopia 1981  Sub-Saharan  Africa  32.73  7.69  2.71  0.324  0.07  0 0 
Ethiopia 1995  Sub-Saharan  Africa  31.25  7.95  2.99  0.399  0.09  0 0 
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Share of GDP 
(constant 1995 
dollars) 
Gambia  1992  Sub-Saharan  Africa  53.69 23.27 13.28  0.478  0  0 0 
Ghana 1987  Sub-Saharan  Africa  47.68  16.6  7.81  0.353  0.11  1 0.02 
Ghana  1989 Sub-Saharan  Africa  50.44  17.71  8.36  0.359  0.12  6 0.11 
Ghana  1992 Sub-Saharan  Africa  45.31  13.73  5.61  0.339  0.18  7 0.12 
Ghana  1999 Sub-Saharan  Africa  44.81  17.28  8.71  0.327  0.32  26 0.37 
Guatemala  1987  Latin  America  47.04 22.47 13.63  0.582  2.09  0 0 
Guatemala  1989  Latin  America  39.81 19.79 12.59  0.596  2.34  69 0.59 
Honduras 1989  Latin  America  44.67 20.65 12.08  0.595  2.11  35 1.05 
Honduras  1992 Latin  America  38.98 17.74 10.4 0.545  2.74  60 1.65 
Honduras  1994 Latin  America  37.93 16.6  9.38  0.552  3.23  85 2.23 
Honduras  1996 Latin  America  40.49 17.47  9.72  0.537  3.66  128 3.12 
Hungary 1989  Europe,  Central  Asia  0 0 0  0.233  2.02  0 0 
Hungary 1993  Europe,  Central  Asia  0 0 0  0.279  1.75  0 0 
India 1983  South  Asia  52.55  16.27  NA  0.32  0.04  2311 1.25 
India  1986 South  Asia  47.46 13.92  NA  0.337 0.06  2105 0.99 
India  1988 South  Asia  47.99 13.51  NA  0.329 0.07  2402 0.98 
India  1990 South  Asia  45.95 12.63  NA  0.312 0.09  1875 0.68 
India  1995 South  Asia  46.75 12.72  NA  0.363 0.11  7685 2.17 
India  1997 South  Asia  44.03 11.96  NA  0.378 0.12  10688 2.7 
Indonesia 1987  East  Asia  28.08  6.08  1.78  0.331  0.01  86 0.07 
Indonesia  1993 East  Asia  14.82 2.98 0.39  0.317  0.05  346 0.2 
Indonesia  1996 East  Asia  7.81 0.95 0.18  0.364  0.08  796 0.39 
Indonesia  1998 East  Asia  26.33 5.43 1.69  0.315  0.1  959 0.4 
Iran  1990  Middle East, North 
Africa 
0.9 0.8  NA  0.434 0.63  1 0.01 
Jamaica  1988  Latin  America  5.02 1.38 0.67  0.431 17.03  76 1.73 
Jamaica  1990 Latin  America  0.62 0.03 0.01  0.418 19.07  136 2.75 
Jamaica  1993 Latin  America  4.52 0.86 0.29  0.379 21.8  187 3.39 
Jamaica  1996 Latin  America  3.15 0.73 0.32  0.364 24.4  636 11.46 
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Share of GDP 
(constant 1995 
dollars) 
Jordan  1987  Middle East, North 
Africa 
0 0 0  0.36  0.87  939 16.72 
Jordan  1992  Middle East, North 
Africa 
0.55 0.12 0.05  0.433  0.93  843 14.46 
Jordan  1997  Middle East, North 
Africa 
0.36 0.1  0.06  0.364  0.94  1655 23.08 
Kazakhstan  1988  Europe, Central Asia  0.05 0.02 0.01  0.257  0  0 0 
Kazakhstan  1993  Europe, Central Asia  1.06  0.04  0.01  0.326  0  0 0 
Kazakhstan  1996  Europe, Central Asia  1.49  0.27  0.1  0.354  0  10 0.05 
Kenya 1992  Sub-Saharan  Africa  33.54  12.82  6.62  0.574  0  0 0 
Kenya 1994  Sub-Saharan  Africa  26.54  9.03  4.5  0.445  0  0 0 
Kyrgyz Republic  1988  Europe, Central Asia  0  0  0  0.26  0  0 0 
Kyrgyz Republic  1993  Europe, Central Asia  22.99  10.87  6.82  0.537  0  2 0.1 
Kyrgyz Republic  1997  Europe, Central Asia  1.57  0.28  0.1  0.405  0  3 0.17 
Latvia 1988  Europe,  Central  Asia  0 0 0  0.225  0  0 0 
Latvia  1993  Europe, Central Asia  0  0  0  0.269  0  0 0 
Latvia  1995  Europe, Central Asia  0  0  0  0.284  0  0 0 
Latvia  1998  Europe, Central Asia  0.19  0.01  0  0.323  0  3 0.05 
Lesotho 1987  Sub-Saharan  Africa  30.34  12.66  6.85  0.56  0  0 0 
Lesotho  1993  Sub-Saharan  Africa  43.14 20.26 11.84  0.579  0  0 0 
Lithuania  1988  Europe, Central Asia  0  0  0  0.224  0  0 0 
Lithuania  1993  Europe, Central Asia  16.47  3.37  0.95  0.336  0  0 0 
Lithuania  1996  Europe, Central Asia  0  0  0  0.323  0  2 0.03 
Madagascar  1980  Sub-Saharan  Africa  49.18 19.74 10.21  0.468  0  0 0 
Madagascar  1994  Sub-Saharan  Africa  60.17 24.46 12.83  0.434  0  11 0.35 
Mali 1989  Sub-Saharan  Africa  16.46  3.92  1.39  0.365  0  76 3.49 
Mali  1994  Sub-Saharan  Africa  72.29 37.38 23.06  0.505  0  103 4.43 
Mauritania  1988  Sub-Saharan  Africa  40.64 19.07 12.75  0.425  0  9 1.04 
Mauritania 1993  Sub-Saharan  Africa  49.37  17.83  8.58  0.5  0  2 0.2 
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Share of GDP 
(constant 1995 
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Mauritania 1995  Sub-Saharan  Africa  30.98 9.99 4.59  0.389  0  5 0.47 
Mexico 1984  Latin  America  12.05  2.65  0.78  0.54  1.86  1127 0.47 
Mexico  1989 Latin  America  16.2 5.63  2.75  0.551 4.66  2213 0.87 
Mexico  1992 Latin  America  13.31 3.23 1.04  0.543  6.1  3070 1.07 
Mexico  1995 Latin  America  17.9 6.15  2.92  0.537 7.39  3673 1.28 
Moldova  1988  Europe, Central Asia  0  0  0  0.241  0  0 0 
Moldova  1992  Europe, Central Asia  7.31 1.32 0.32  0.344  0  0 0 
Morocco  1985  Middle East, North 
Africa 
2.04 0.7  0.5  0.392  4.38  967 3.81 
Morocco  1990  Middle East, North 
Africa 
0.14 0.02 0.01  0.392  4.02  1336 4.24 
Mozambique 1996  Sub-Saharan  Africa  37.85  12.02  5.42  0.396  0  0 0 
Namibia 1993  Sub-Saharan  Africa  34.93  13.97  6.93  0.743  0  8 0.25 
Nepal 1985  South  Asia  42.13  10.79  3.75  0.334  0  39 1.43 
Nepal 1995  South  Asia  37.68  9.74  3.71  0.387  0  101 2.3 
Nicaragua 1993  Latin  America  47.94  20.4  11.19  0.503  4.38 25 1.47 
Niger 1993  Sub-Saharan  Africa  41.73  12.43  5.29  0.361  0  13 0.74 
Niger  1995  Sub-Saharan  Africa  61.42 33.93 23.66  0.506  0  6 0.32 
Nigeria 1997  Sub-Saharan  Africa  70.24  34.91  NA  0.505  0.09  1920 6.37 
Pakistan 1988  South  Asia  49.63  14.85  6.03  0.333  0.11  2013 4.56 
Pakistan  1991 South  Asia  47.76  14.57  6.04  0.332  0.16  1848 3.62 
Pakistan  1993 South  Asia  33.9  8.44  3.01  0.342  0.18  1562 2.78 
Pakistan  1997 South  Asia  30.96  6.16  1.86  0.312  0.22  1409 2.19 
Panama 1989  Latin  America  16.57 7.84 4.9  0.565  3.53  14 0.25 
Panama  1991 Latin  America  18.9 8.87  5.48  0.568 3.55  14 0.21 
Panama  1995 Latin  America  14.73 6.15 3.39  0.57  3.61  16 0.2 
Panama  1997 Latin  America  10.31 3.15 3.67  0.485  3.67  16 0.19 
Paraguay 1990  Latin  America  11.05 2.47 0.8  0.397  0  43 0.56 
Paraguay 1995  Latin  America  19.36 8.27 4.65  0.591  0  200 2.21 
Peru  1985  Latin  America  1.14 0.29 0.14  0.457  0.33  0 0 
Peru  1994  Latin  America  9.13 2.37 0.92  0.446  0.89  472 0.96 
Peru  1997 Latin  America  15.49  5.38  2.81  0.462  1.03  636 1.08   36

























Share of GDP 
(constant 1995 
dollars) 
Philippines 1985  East  Asia  22.78  5.32  1.66  0.41  1.26 111 0.21 
Philippines  1988 East  Asia  18.28 3.59 0.94  0.407  1.49  388 0.64 
Philippines  1991 East  Asia  15.7 2.79  0.66  0.438 1.69  329 0.49 
Philippines  1994 East  Asia  18.36 3.85 1.07  0.429  1.86  443 0.62 
Philippines  1997 East  Asia  14.4 2.85  0.75  0.461 2  1057 1.28 
Poland  1987  Europe, Central Asia  0  0  0  0.255  1.89  0 0 
Poland  1990  Europe, Central Asia  0.08  0.027  0.02  0.283  1.84  0 0 
Poland  1992  Europe, Central Asia  0.08  0.031  0.02  0.271  1.81  0 0 
Romania  1989  Europe, Central Asia  0  0  0  0.233  0.62  0 0 
Romania  1992  Europe, Central Asia  0.8  0.34  0.31  0.254  0.77  0 0 
Romania  1994  Europe, Central Asia  2.81  0.76  0.43  0.282  0.88  4 0.01 
Russian Federation  1994  Europe, Central Asia  6.23  1.6  0.55  0.436  0.34  0 0 
Russian Federation  1996  Europe, Central Asia  7.24  1.6  0.47  0.48  0.35  0 0 
Russian Federation  1998  Europe, Central Asia  7.05  1.45  0.39  0.487  0.36  0 0 
Senegal 1991  Sub-Saharan  Africa  45.38 19.95 11.18  0.541  0  105 2.54 
Senegal 1994  Sub-Saharan  Africa  26.26 7.04 2.73  0.412  0  73 1.71 
Sierra Leone  1989  Sub-Saharan Africa  56.81 40.45 33.8 0.628  0.18  0 0 
South Africa  1993  Sub-Saharan Africa  11.47  1.83  0.38  0.593  0.14  0 0 
Sri Lanka  1985  South Asia  9.39  1.69  0.5  0.324  0.06  292 3.45 
Sri Lanka  1990 South  Asia  3.82 0.67 0.23  0.301  0.12  401 4 
Sri Lanka  1995 South  Asia  6.56 1  0.26  0.343  0.3  790 6.06 
Tanzania  1991  Sub-Saharan  Africa  48.54 24.42 15.4 0.59  0  0 0 
Tanzania 1993  Sub-Saharan  Africa  19.89  4.77  1.66  0.381  0  0 0 
Thailand 1988  East  Asia 25.91  7.36  2.73  0.438  0.17 0 0 
Thailand  1992 East  Asia  6.02 0.48 0.05  0.462  0.21  0 0 
Thailand  1996 East  Asia  2.2 0.14  0.01  0.434 0.24  0 0 
Thailand  1998 East  Asia  0 0 0  0.413  0.25  0 0 
Trinidad, Tobago  1992  Latin America  12.36  3.48  NA  0.402  10.5  6 0.12 
Tunisia  1985  Middle East, North 
Africa 
1.67 0.34 0.13  0.434  3.12  271 2.11 
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Share of GDP 
(constant 1995 
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Tunisia  1990  Middle East, North 
Africa 
1.26 0.33 0.16  0.402  3.01  551 3.71 
Turkey  1987  Europe, Central Asia  1.49 0.36 0.17  0.435  4.18  2021 1.56 
Turkey  1994  Europe, Central Asia  2.35 0.55 0.24  0.415  4.13  2627 1.66 
Turkmenistan  1988  Europe, Central Asia  0  0  0  0.264  0  0 0 
Turkmenistan  1993  Europe, Central Asia  20.92  5.69  2.1  0.357  0  0 0 
Uganda 1989  Sub-Saharan  Africa  39.17  14.99  7.57  0.443  0  0 0 
Uganda 1993  Sub-Saharan  Africa  36.7  11.44  5  0.391  0  0 0 
Ukraine  1989  Europe, Central Asia  0  0  0  0.233  0  0 0 
Ukraine  1992  Europe, Central Asia  0.04  0.01  0.01  0.257  0  0 0 
Ukraine  1996  Europe, Central Asia  0  0  0  0.325  0  0 0 
Uruguay 1989  Latin  America  1.1  0.47  0.4  0.423  0  0 0 
Uzbekistan 1988  Europe,  Central  Asia  0 0 0  0.249  0  0 0 
Uzbekistan 1993  Europe,  Central  Asia  3.29 0.46 0.11  0.332  0  0 0 
Venezuela 1981  Latin  America  6.3  1.08  0.25  0.556  0.08  0 0 
Venezuela  1987 Latin  America  6.6 1.04  0.22  0.534 0.14  0 0 
Venezuela  1989 Latin  America  8.49 1.77 0.49  0.557  0.19  0 0 
Venezuela  1993 Latin  America  2.66 0.57 0.22  0.416  0.29  0 0 
Venezuela  1996 Latin  America  14.69 5.62 3.17  0.487  0.36  0 0 
Yemen  1992  Middle East, North 
Africa 
5.07 0.93  NA  0.394  0  1018 28.49 
Yemen  1998  Middle East, North 
Africa 
10.7 2.42  0.85  0.344 0  1202 23.77 
Zambia  1991  Sub-Saharan  Africa  58.59 31.04 20.18  0.483  0  0 0 
Zambia  1993  Sub-Saharan  Africa  69.16 38.49 25.7 0.462  0  0 0 
Zambia  1996  Sub-Saharan  Africa  72.63 37.75 23.88  0.497  0  0 0 
Zimbabwe 1991  Sub-Saharan  Africa  35.95  11.39  4.56  0.568  0  0 0 
 
Notes:  All poverty and inequality data from World Bank, Global Poverty Monitoring database.  Migration data from U.S. Population Census and OECD, 
Trends in International Migration.  Remittance data from IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook. 
 